Weapons die for all kinds of different reasons. Sometimes they
happen at the wrong time, either in the midst of defense austerity or with the wrong constellation
of personnel. Sometimes they fall victim to the byzantine bureaucracy of the pentagon or to turf
fights between the services and sometimes they die because they were a bad idea in the first
place.
For the same reasons bad defense systems can often survive the most inept management if
they fill a particular niche well enough. this article concentrates on five systems that died
but that might have had transformative effects if they had survived. These transformations would only
rarely have changed the course of wars countries win and lose wars for many reasons besides
technology, but rather would have had ripple effects across the entire defense industrial base. Altering how our military organizations approached war fighting and procurement. Not all the changes
would have been for the best sometimes programs are canceled for sound reasons.
1. HA-56 Cheyenne
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| AH-56 Cheyenne |
In the early 1960s the army was just beginning to appreciate the value of helicopter aviation. The army had used helicopters at the end of World War II and used them extensively in korea
for reconnaissance and evacuation purposes, as the sophistication of the machines grew. However
the army began to see the prospect for much more advanced helicopters that could conduct
a wide variety of missions.
The star of the show was supposed to be the A-56 Cheyenne
a radical design that combined high speed with punching power. The Cheyenne could escort other
helicopters in transport mission or conduct ground support and attack ops independently.
In particular it contained a magnificent propulsion system that could offer speeds of up to
275 miles per hour, but the cheyenne fell victim to its own promise. The technologies that made
the cheyenne possible weren't yet mature and the early prototypes suffered from teething problems
leading to a fatal crash.
The air force hated the whole idea of the cheyenne, believing that the army was trying to steal close air support and interdiction missions for itself. The air force went so far as to propose a fixed wing attack aircraft which would
eventually become the A-10 in its effort to kill the program.
Finally the vietnam war put enormous pressure on the defense budget. Both in terms of making
it harder to sell particular programs and in diverting funds to directly support the war effort
and so the cheyenne never happened. Although a few years later the army would push forward with the AH-64 apache. In this sense the cancellation of the cheyenne merely delayed an advanced attack
helicopter capability. But the apache was also a much safer machine than the cheyenne
and going with the more conventional system has undoubtedly limited the horizons of army aviation.
2. B-70 Valkyrie
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| B-70 Valkyrie |
The B-70 valkyrie deserves its own operatic cycle, envisioned as the
replacement for the B-52 Strato Fortress and the B-58 Hustler. The B-70 was designed to
penetrate soviet airspace at high altitude and upwards of mach 3.
Beloved of the bomber mafia
a generation of senior officers who had cut their teeth in world war two's combined bomber offensive. The B-70 represented to many the future of the air force and just to show i'm not a hard-hearted guy
and it's not all dollars and cents, the B-70 was a beautiful aircraft. Long and sleek the Valkyrie
resembles a spaceship more than an aircraft.
The surviving prototype remains on display at the
national museum of the united states air force in Dayton Ohio. But the Valkyrie was enormously
expensive and this expense made it vulnerable. First president eisenhower then secretary of
defense Robert Mcnamara were less than enchanted with the idea of spending enormous sums on another
heavy bomber when icbms showed great promise in delivering nuclear weapons to the soviet homeland.
Advances in soviet interceptor and surface-to-air missile technology were also making the B-70s
mission considerably more dangerous than first anticipated. After constructing only
two prototypes one of which was lost during a PR Stunt, the air force shut production down.
Fifteen years later the B-1B with some superficially similar characteristics would
enter service. The effect of the B-70 on the air force would have on balance been quite negative. Devoting tremendous resources to the procurement of another strategic bomber would have drawn
attention away from both the tactical air force and the missile force.
B-70s might in desperation
have been committed to the bombing of Vietnam during operations linebacker IN2. But they would
likely have performed no more effectively than the B-52s they were replacing and both the B-52
and the B-1B have proven remarkably flexible in terms of missions and update technologies, in part
because they have space for a larger crew 4 and 5, respectively than the Valkyrie. Mcnamara saved the
air force from itself by preventing a long deep procurement chasm that would have lasted 30 years.
3. A-12 Avenger
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| A-12 Avenger |
What if we had a stealthy strike bomber that could take off from aircraft carriers. In the mid-1980s the navy needed a replacement for the beloved but venerable a6 intruder. Building on expectations about the progress of stealth technology, Mcdonnell Douglas developed
the A-12 avenger a subsonic flying wing bomber that visually resembled a miniature B-2 spirit. Combining stealth with the flexibility of carrier ops, the A-12 promised an unparalleled deep strike
capability.
Even the air force expressed interest in the A-12 as a replacement for
the F-111 aardvark. But there were problems early expectations about the stealth coating
proved optimistic and the fixes substantially increased the avengers weight. Expenses soared
but the aircraft did not.
The biggest problem however was that the avenger entered the design
and production cycle just as the cold war came to a close. Facing a tight defense budget
secretary of defense dick cheney decided to kill the A-12 in favor of less risky programs.
4. Future Combat Systems (FCS)
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In the early 21st century the body of theory known as the
revolution in military affairs resulted in a major army procurement plan known as
future combat systems. In brief the application of rma theory to modern operations suggested that
the combination of precision guided munitions, high processing speeds, real-time communications
and all-encompassing sensor capabilities would transform the way in which armies fought.
Future
combat systems envisioned an integrated system of weapons, vehicles and sensors that could prove
lethal and decisive across the combat spectrum. The army expected every element of the system to
support the goal of linking sensors to shooters, enhancing killing power while reducing footprint.
Army planners also intended fcs to result lighter, more deployable brigades and so FCS died
a slow death. The vision of a coherent system of systems surrendered to the need to get particular
capabilities into the field in piecemeal fashion, regardless of their role in the larger puzzle.
The army fought the iraq and afghanistan wars with a mix of new and legacy systems, combined with weapons that had no place in its future expectations. While individual
parts of the FCS vision survive the ideal has yielded to budgetary and military reality.
5. See Control Ship
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| See Control Ship |
What if instead of a few very large carriers, the united states navy
had undertaken to build a large number of small carriers. In World War II the royal navy and the
u.s navy employed large numbers of escort carriers, small flat ops that could support anti-submarine
and amphibious operations.
In the early 1970s Admiral Elmo Zumwalt pushed the idea of the
sea control ship, a small carrier that would defend sea lanes against long-range soviet
strike aircraft and soviet submarines.
Faced with the growing expense of modern super carriers the
first nimitz class carrier would enter service in just a few years and the impending retirement of
the venerable essex class carriers. Zumwalt sought a low-cost option for air operations that did not
demand the full capabilities of a major carrier group. Escort carriers had helped win the battle
of the atlantic and sea control ships might make a similar contribution in a nato warsaw
pact conflict.
The USN tried the concept with the helicopter carrier uss guam for a couple of years, adding hairier fighters to its complement of choppers. eventually however the navy decided
that the expense of the new ships and the risk that they might cut into resources dedicated to
super carriers were too great and nixed the idea. Eventually the big amphibious ships of the tarawa
and wasp classes would take over the sea control role. In effect the usn acquired sea control ships, although we call them amphibious assault ships and delegate to them a broader array of tasks. We also rely on other countries to build small carriers to fulfill the missions envisioned by
the SCS.
Many of the flat ops operated by the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy and Japan essentially
fulfill an SCS role. Pursuit of the sea control ship would obviously have led to a different
naval force structure as well as changes in the composition of naval aviation. The biggest difference however might have been conceptual the sea control ship might
have changed the way we think about how naval aviation contributes to international security.
Conclusion is technology undoubtedly matters but only rarely in the sense that
an isolated technological achievement lends decisive advantage in tactical engagements. Rather technological innovations and choices shape the ways in which military organizations and the
broader defense industrial complex, approach the prospect of war. Each of these systems
involved a radical rethink of organizational roles and priorities and the cancellation of
each left huge holes in capabilities. Holes that continue to be filled in novel ways.
