For that reason a 2018 article published
in a russian military industry journal
criticizing the viability of russia's Tu-160 blackjack strategic nuclear
bomber makes for interesting reading. Revealing an authentically russian
perspective on the challenges facing a
key component of moscow's airborne
nuclear deterrence.
The author Andre Gorbachevsky who also
posted a follow-up article replying to
criticisms of his argument is a radar
specialist with experience managing the
development of air defense technology
going back to the 1980s. His take shouldn't be taken as the final
word on the Tu-160 Blackjack's
effectiveness.
After all even highly
informed defense experts disagree all
the time on the utility of various
technologies and tactics. Nonetheless, his piece opens a window to
internal debates regarding russia's
nuclear deterrence priorities and offers
insight as to how north america's air
defenses appear from the attacker's
perspective. As profiled in greater detail here in
1945, the tuple of Tu-160 codenamed blackjack
by NATO is a huge swing wing bomber
capable of surging to up to twice the
speed of sound and traversing huge
distances across the globe cruising at
subsonic speeds.
The Blackjack entered service in the
closing years of the cold war and russia
has invested considerable resources in
rebuilding its small fleet presently
counting 16 or 17 flyable aircraft. The Tu-160s primary mission was and
remains to lob long-range nuclear-armed
cruise missiles, at high-value targets in
the united states, providing a global
second strike capability in case
russia's land-based nuclear forces are
largely destroyed by an adversary's
first strike. Secondarily Tu-160s could assail u.s
navy carrier task forces.
Gorbachevsky's article was in response
to moscow's announced plans to spend the
equivalent of over 2.1 billion
assembling 10 additional modernized Tu-160 M2 bombers with total production
supposedly aimed at 50 additional
aircraft. He believes this is a fool's errand, especially once high lifetime operating
costs are factored in. Due to its radar cross section of 10 to
15 square meters he warns even with the
presence of electronic warfare systems. it won't be possible to hide such a
conspicuous target as the Tu-160 in the
future.
Though the Tu-160 M2 model is receiving
a modernized electronic warfare system, gorbachevsky estimates it would have to
be 10 times more powerful than its
current 1980s era by call jammer to be
effective against contemporary
jam-resistant Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radars on u.s
fighters. that amount of power would necessitate
increased electrical generation and
weight. he compares the tu-160
unfavorably to the similar but smaller US B-1B lancer bomber, arguing the soviet
designs much faster supersonic sprint as
a poor trade-off for the latter's
smaller Radar Cross-Section (RCS) which
also requires a less powerful electronic
warfare system for self-defense.
